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Abstract

Privacy-preserving data publishing is a mechanism for sharing data while ensuring the
privacy of individuals is preserved in the published data and utility is maintained for data
mining and analysis. There is a huge need for sharing genomic data to advance medical and
health research. However, since genomic data is highly sensitive and the ultimate identifier,
it is a big challenge to publish genomic data while protecting the privacy of individuals in
the data.
In this thesis, we address the aforementioned challenge by presenting an approach
for privacy-preserving genomic data publishing via differentially-private suffix tree. The
proposed algorithm uses a top-down approach and utilizes Laplace mechanism to divide
the raw genomic data into disjoint partitions, and then normalize the partitioning structure
to ensure consistency and maintain utility. The output of our algorithm is a differentiallyprivate suffix tree, a data structure most suitable for efficient search on genomic data. We
experiment on real-life genomic data obtained from the Human Genome Privacy Challenge
project, and we show that our approach is efficient, scalable, and achieves high utility with
respect to genomic sequence matching count queries.
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Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

In this revolutionary era of science and technology, it is much easier to access, analyze and
interpret genomic data. Genomes are the most vital part of the human, as they include
health and other information about the person, as well as their ancestors, siblings and
decedents. Since the sharing of genomic data is essential for the advancement of genomic
research, it is important to ensure that the sensitive information about individuals in their
genomic sequences is protected in any shared data for scientific research. Maintaining the
correct trade-off between utility and privacy is particularly challenging for genomic data
as each individuals’ DNA sequence is unique and therefore, a DNA sample can never be
made truly anonymized.
According to the National Human Genome Research Institute (NHGRI) [38]:
“People have a right to keep their medical information, and that of their dependents,
private. Yet medical records are a rich source of research data, and it is in the interest
of medical research, and thus everyone’s health and well-being, that scientists have
access to large numbers of participants and quantities of data. How do we strike the
proper balance between scientific progress and patient privacy?”
The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) [1] and Genetic
Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA) [2] are the frameworks provided by the government to achieve the aforementioned delicate balance.
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Genome Wide Association Studies (GWAS) investigate genomic and biometric data
with the purpose of identifying genetic variations that may be linked to diseases. The goal
of GWAS is to produce aggregate statistics that are produced by examining many single
nucleotide polymorphism (SNPs) locations from a group of study participants. This can
be achieved by calculating chi-squared and p-value statistics. Since the aggregate statistics
are taken from a sample of thousands of individuals, researchers believed that privacy was
preserved by using de-identification techniques and a large sample size.
With the emergence of cloud computing, the possibility of large scale distribution
of data collection from multiple resources has increased, as has the threat to privacy or
information leakage. Recent work has shown, however, that the large volume of data
collected from each patient exposes them to privacy breaches, even if only the aggregate
statistics are reported. Homer et al. [36] show that a participant’s information can be
inferred from the allele frequencies of a large number of single-nucleotide polymorphisms
(SNPs). Given the minor allele frequencies (MAFs) of both a reference population and a
test population, the presence of an individual with a known genotype can be inferred using
a t-test and a distance metric designed to contrast similarity between an individual and the
test population. Table 1.1 shows example statistics for Homer’s attack, where given the
genome of the victim (set of variants), the size of the mixture and the population allele
frequencies, an attacker can re-identify an individual in a case group with a certain disease
by calculating the distance measure D(x) = |x − p| − |x − m|. If D > 0, it means that
an individual is most likely to be in the mixture and if D < 0, it means that an individual
is most likely to be in the reference population. D = 0 means equally likely to be in the
mixture and in the reference population. Wang et al. [87] show that a participants’ actual
genome can be reconstructed using correlation information about the SNPs. There are
many other attacks [32] [31] [71] that could result in breaching the privacy of individuals.
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Table 1.1: Homer’s Attack : The attacker knows the genome of the victim (set of variants),
the size of the mixture he’s attacking and the population allele frequencies. [36]
Distance Measure
D(x) = |x − p| − |x − m|

j

Allele Frequency
Reference Popula- Mixture(m) Person of Intion(p)
terest(x)
0.25
0.75
1.0

j+1

0.25

0.75

0.50

0.00

j+2

0.25

0.75

0.0

-0.50

Id

0.50

Inference
Most likely to be in the Mixture
Equally likely to be in the
Mixture and in the Reference Population
Most likely to be in the Reference Population

It is a challenge to promote privacy-preserving genomic data sharing for scientific
research, given that genomic data is extremely high-dimensional and cannot be revoked.
It is a treasure trove of sensitive information and it is the ultimate identifier, as it contains
millions of SNPs that are easily identifiable. As shown in [36], not only the genomic data
needs to be protected, but the analysis results containing allele frequencies or test statistics
as well. Therefore, there is a need to strike a balance between privacy and utility such that
the output is privacy-preserving while utility is maintained.

1.1

Motivation

Several methods have been proposed to address the problem of privacy-preserving data
publishing. Samarati [74] and Sweeney [77] propose the k-anonymity privacy model,
which stipulates that an individual should not be identifiable from a group of less than k
individuals based on quasi-identifier attributes QIDs. However, Machanavajjhala et al. [55]
show that with additional knowledge about the victim, k-anonymous data is vulnerable
against background knowledge attacks. Similarly, there are a number of other partitionbased privacy models such as (α − k) anonymity [90] [39], t-closeness [53] [76] and
(c − k)-safety that model the adversary differently and have different assumptions about
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its background knowledge. The following example illustrates how background knowledge
can be used to infer sensitive information from k-anonymous genomic data.
Example 1.1.1. Given raw data as shown in Figure 1.1 containing genomic information
about individuals, we anonymize the raw data and generate 2-anonymous data. If the
attacker knows that the data contains information about a person who is an engineer and
35 years of age, then the attacker can determine with 100% certainty that the genomic
sequence of that person starts with nucleotide A. However, a differentially-private version
of the raw data neutralizes the linkage attack i.e., if you cannot link when I am not in the
database, then obviously you cannot link when I am in the database. An attacker can not
infer anything about an individual by looking at differentially-private data, regardless of
any background knowledge.



Therefore, we use differential privacy to privately publish genomic data. There are
different ways to publish genomic data as shown in Figure 1.2. Given raw genomic data, a
first approach is to apply differential privacy and release the data, where the released data
will provide utility and consistency, but will not support an efficient search on genomic
data. Therefore, to ensure efficiency, a second approach is to release a suffix tree, an
efficient data structure for genomic search, by applying differential privacy on the genomic
data, but this tree will result in poor utility due to inconsistent suffixes. So, a third approach
is to construct a suffix tree from raw data and then apply differential privacy and release a
differentially-private suffix tree. Using this approach, we will be able to achieve efficiency
because it will output a suffix tree, however, measuring utility and consistency is unclear.
Therefore, we came up with a fourth approach (our approach), that is a hybrid approach. It
takes raw genomic data, generates differentially-private suffixes, applies utility constraint
to maintain usefulness and then generates a suffix tree. This approach provides utility,
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Raw Data

Differentially-Private Data
Background Knowledge
(Age: 35, Job: Engineer)

2 - Anonymous Data
Background Knowledge
(Age: 35, Job: Engineer)

Figure 1.1: Given raw data that contains age, sex, job and sequence, we anonymize the
data and generate two versions, i.e., 2-Anonymous Data and Differentially-Private Data. If
an attacker has background knowledge that the data contains information about a person
who is an engineer and 35 years of age, then looking at 2-Anonymous Data, the attacker
can determine with 100% certainty that the genomic sequence of that person starts with
nucleotide A. However, a differentially-private version of the raw data neutralizes the
linkage attack and provides privacy guarantees irrespective of an attacker’s background
knowledge and computational power.

consistency and efficiency by ensuring that the suffixes are consistent and the outputted
suffix tree provides differential privacy.
In this thesis, we address the problem of privacy-preserving genomic data publishing
by proposing an approach that efficiently perturbs the raw genome data and outputs an
anonymized suffix tree that is privacy-preserving to effectively and efficiently support
count queries for genomic sequence matching. To generate a privacy-preserving suffix tree,
we utilize differential privacy [21], a rigorous privacy model that provides strong privacy
guarantees independent of an adversary’s background knowledge and computational power.
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Utility

Consistency
Efficiency
DP-Genomic Data
Utility

Consistency
Efficiency
DP-Genomic Data

DP-Suffix Tree

Utility

DP

Genomic Data

Consistency
Suffix Tree

Efficiency
DP-Suffix Tree

Our Contribution
Utility

Consistency
Efficiency
DP-Suffixes

Consistent DP-Suffixes

DP-Suffix Tree

Figure 1.2: Alternative approaches to publish genomic data via differential privacy
Differential privacy is typically achieved through random perturbation, where noise is
carefully calibrated to the sensitivity. A differentially-private mechanism ensures that all
outputs are insensitive to the individual’s data. In other words, an individual’s privacy is
not at risk because of her participation in the dataset.
Our approach consists of a three-phase algorithm. Given raw genomic data D, we first
construct a differential private partitioning tree, then we apply a bottom-up approach to
normalize the tree, and finally we apply a top-down approach on the normalized tree to
obtain a differentially-private suffix tree.
The contributions of this thesis can be summarized as follows:
• We propose a novel non-interactive approach for anonymizing genomic data and
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releasing a B-differentially-private suffix tree with an effective utility for genomic
sequence matching. We are the first to publish a differentially-private suffix tree for
efficient searching on genomic data.
• We propose a top-down partitioning approach using the Laplace mechanism to efficiently process datasets containing a large number of genomic sequences.
• To obtain higher utility, we apply a normalization technique on the partitions to
ensure consistency among genomic sequences and their suffixes.
• We implemented our approach and performed extensive experiments on real-life
genomic data obtained from the Human Genome Privacy Challenge [3]. The results
show that our approach is efficient, scalable, and achieves high utility with respect to
count queries.

1.2

Thesis Statement

The objective of this thesis is to answer the following question: How can a data owner
publish genomic data while simultaneously safeguarding the privacy of the data and
maintaining its usefulness?
More specifically, given a genomic data D, where D contains sequential genomic
data sequences {S1 , . . . , Sn } and given a privacy budget B, our objective is to generate a
differentially-private suffix tree T for efficient search that supports data mining and analysis
tasks such that:
1. T satisfies B-differential privacy.
2. T preserves data utility with respect to count queries.
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3. The proposed approach is efficient and scalable.

1.3

Organization of the Thesis

The thesis is organized as follows:
• Chapter 2 discusses the building blocks/preliminaries to establish the background
knowledge needed for this thesis work.
• Chapter 3 talks about the related work that has been done in this field.
• Chapter 4 elaborates the proposed approach to address the problem discussed.
• Chapter 5 discusses the privacy and complexity analysis of our proposed approach.
• Chapter 6 describes the experiments and performance evaluation of our proposed
solution.
• Chapter 7 concludes our work followed by a discussion about future work.
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Chapter 2

BACKGROUND

In this chapter, we introduce and define the building blocks/preliminaries that help establish
the foundational knowledge required to better understand the proposed work.

2.1

Genomic Data

The human genome is the complete set of genetic information which is composed of
four nucleotide bases: adenine, cytosine, guanine and, thymine, represented by the letters
A,C,G,T respectively. Single nucleotide polymorphisms, frequently called SNPs (pronounced “snips”), are the most common type of genetic variation among humans. Mostly,
these variations are found in the DNA between genes in a single nucleotide that occurs at a
specific position in the genome, where each variation is present to some appreciable degree
within a population. Each SNP represents a difference in a single DNA building block,
called a nucleotide, e.g., SNP may replace the nucleotide cytosine (C) with the nucleotide
thymine (T) in a certain stretch of DNA.
Figure 2.1 shows an example of a DNA sequence of three different people. We observe
that at most locations, they have exactly the same nucleotide bases but there is a specific
location in which there is a variation; this variation is called a SNP.
While SNPs occur throughout a person’s DNA, the frequency of occurrence is on
average once in 300 nucleotides. They act as biological markers, which help scientists
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Single Nucleotide
Polymorphisms

Nucleotide

Figure 2.1: Example of genomic data of three different individuals

and researchers to identify and associate genes with diseases. They also help to identify
and study particular disease trends among particular age groups. When SNPs occur within
a gene or in a regulatory region near a gene, they may play a more direct role in causing
certain diseases by affecting the genes function. For example, at a specific base position in
the human genome, the C nucleotide may appear in most individuals, but in a minority
of individuals, the position is taken by an A. This means that there is a SNP at this
specific position, and the two possible nucleotide variations C or A are said to be alleles
for this position. SNPs also identify differences in our susceptibility to disease, e.g.,
sickle-cell anemia, β-thalassemia and cystic fibrosis. The severity of illness and the way
our body responds to treatments are also manifestations of genetic variations. For example,
a single-base mutation in the APOE (apolipoprotein E) gene is associated with a higher
risk for Alzheimer’s disease [30]. Since the human genome contains the most vital and
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sensitive information about the person, their ancestors and family members, it is essential
to ensure human genome privacy.

2.2

Differential Privacy

Differential Privacy is a model introduced by Dwork et al. [21] for the purpose of preserving data privacy without making assumptions about the attacker’s background knowledge.
Differential privacy provides a strong guarantee that the presence or absence of an individual will not affect the final output of the query significantly.

2.2.1 -Differential Privacy
Definition 2.2.1. -Differential Privacy [88]. Given any two neighbouring datasets D1 and
D2 that differ on, at most, one record, a sanitizing mechanism M preserves -differential
privacy if for any output D̂ ∈ Range(M ):

P r[M (D1 ) = D̂]≤e ×P r[M (D2 ) = D̂]
where the probabilities are over the randomness of M .



To achieve differential privacy, noise must be added to the true output by calibrating
the noise to the sensitivity. The sensitivity of a function is a measure of the change in the
output when one of the inputs is changed. Calibrating noise to sensitivity was introduced
by Dwork et al. [23].

Sensitivity
Noise can be added to any dataset for generating a noisy dataset to achieve differential
privacy. The amount of noise to be added to achieve -differential privacy is dependent
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on the sensitivity of the function. Therefore, sensitivity can be informally defined as the
maximum change possible by altering a single record (i.e. added or removed). In some
cases, sensitivity may be represented as global sensitivity and therefore shares the same
definition as sensitivity.
Definition 2.2.2. Global Sensitivity [61]. Given a query function f : D → Rd , the global
sensitivity of f is:
∆(f ) = maxD1 ,D2 k f (D1 ) − f (D2 ) k1
where D1 and D2 are any two neighbouring datasets that differ on, at most, one record. 

50

30

Total A

50
20
B

(a) Original Result

Total
(b)

30
A
(f)=1

50
19
B

31

Total A
(c)

19
B

(f)=2

Figure 2.2: (a) represents a histogram depicting data of 50 participants who took part in
a survey, the data is distributed into 2 bins A and B, where bin A and bin B represents the
total number of participants who play basketball and football respectively. Figure 2.2(b)
and Figure 2.2(c) represent neighboring datasets of Figure 2.2(a). Now, let’s consider a
participant from B decides to remove his record from the survey, that is, one value is
changed in the histogram as shown in Figure 2.2(b), therefore, the ∆(f ) is 1. However,
if he would have changed his position from playing football to basketball, i.e. from bin B
to A as shown in Figure 2.2(c), the ∆(f ) would be 2, since 1 value was removed from B and
1 value was added to A in the histogram.
Depending on the type of data, the sensitivity may vary, which in return could affect the
added noise. For example, in tabular data, each row/record represents one individual and
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each column represents the associated attributes. Therefore, when an individual’s record
is added to or removed from the dataset, it affects, at most, one row. Hence, by the above
definition of sensitivity, the value of ∆(f ) is equal to 1. Whereas, in the case of histogram
data, the numerical data is represented graphically (bins/buckets) based on the frequency
distribution. Each bin’s area represents the frequency of occurrence of a certain participantgroup’s data (see Figure 2.2).

Laplace Distribution
To achieve differential privacy when using query function f , the principal approach is
to perturb the true output of f by adding to it a random noise that is adjusted based on
∆(f ). In the study in [21], the authors propose to generate the noise according to Laplace
distribution, Lap(λ), where the probability distribution function is

P r(x|λ) =

1 |x|
eλ
2λ

the mean is 0, and the standard deviation is λ which is determined based on the global
sensitivity ∆(f ) and the privacy level .
Theorem 2.2.1. For any function f : D → Rd that maps datasets to reals, the privacy
mechanism M : M (D) = f (D) + Lap(∆(f )/) satisfies -differential privacy.

Exponential Mechanism
Exponential mechanism is one of the techniques to analyze which outputs will not make
sense after noise is added, and was proposed by McSherry and Talwar [58] to select an
output from the generated outputs such that the score of the utility function q is considered
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to make the decision. These score values represent the chances that the generated output
will be similar to the optimal output where q has low sensitivity; i.e. the higher the score
value, the more the chances of the generated result being similar to the optimal result, and
therefore the more of a chance of it being selected.
The main goal of the Exponential mechanism is mapping n inputs from the domain D
to a range R. This mapping may be randomized so that each element of the domain D
corresponds to the probability distribution over the range R. Assuming for this scenario, q
: (Dn × R) → R is a quality function, such that an instance of a database d ∈ Dn , assigns
a score value to all outcomes r ∈ R.
Definition 2.2.3. [58]Exponential Mechanism: Let the sensitivity of score function q be

S(q) = max k q(A,r) - q(B,r) k
r,A∆B=1

where M is the mechanism for choosing an outcome r ∈ R such that an instance of a
database d ∈ Dn maintains -differential privacy.

M(d,q) = { return r with probability ∝ exp (

q(d, r)
)}
2S(q)

(2.1)


As discussed above, the computed score value denotes the likelihood of a pair (d,r)
having been chosen, i.e., when the score is higher, it is more likely to be chosen. Exponential mechanism introduces a class of mechanisms that include all differentially-private
mechanisms [58]. Therefore, it can be said that for a database and a predefined  value,
the quality function q generates a probability distribution. The Exponential mechanism
samples the output on the output domain over which the probability distribution is gener-
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ated [61]. The high scoring outcomes are exponentially more likely to be chosen, since
the probability function favors them, while ensuring differential privacy. The Exponential
mechanism by [58] is also referred to as exponential sampling technique by [45].

Theorem 2.2.2. For any function having utility score U tility, an algorithm that chooses

(U tility) satisfies -differential
an output with probability directly proportional to exp 2S(q)



privacy.

Gaussian Mechanism
Gaussian mechanism was proposed in [22] and is similar to the Laplace mechanism but
adds independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) Gaussian noise to achieve (,δ)-differential
privacy, where δ > 0 but typically a smaller  for the same utility. We know that Q-function
R ∞ −u2
is defined as Q(x) := √12π x e 2 du. We include the following theorem from [67].
Theorem 2.2.3. Let q: D → Rk be a query and  > 0,

1
2

>δ> 0. Then the Gaussian

mechanism Mq : D × Ω → Rk defined by Mq (d) = q(d) + w, where w ∼ N (0, σ 2 Ik ),
√
(K
+
k 2 + 2) and K = Q−1 (δ), is (,δ)-differentially-private.

where σ ≥ ∆2q
2

The authors of [22] propose a differentially-private mechanism that adds i.i.d. zero
mean Gaussian noise to modify answers to a numeric query. When Gaussian noise is
added, it results in δ-approximate -indistinguishability [21] in the noisy sums, where
the value of  is greater than [log(1/δ)/R]1/2 . Additionally, Exponential noise ensures
-indistinguishability, since the value of δ is zero [22]. The Exponential noise and Gaussian
noise both have their own advantages: where Exponential noise provides a more robust
solution, since δ = 0, Gaussian noise provides better accuracy for any  value.
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2.2.2

(, δ)-Differential Privacy

For an input dataset D to a randomized algorithm K, the random variable corresponding
to D is K (D). The probability of an event occurring is not similar to that of a more
probable event under the distribution K(D1 ) or K(D2 ), because the metric in differential
privacy is multiplicative. This necessary condition for differential privacy was relaxed in
later research, and (,δ)-differential privacy represents a more relaxed differential privacy
model compared with -differential privacy, which provides a stronger privacy guarantee.
(,δ)-differential privacy is defined as follows.
Definition 2.2.4. (,δ)-Differential Privacy: A randomized algorithm K is (,δ)-differentiallyprivate if for all databases D1 , D2 ∈ (D)n such that one individual’s record is varied, where
S represents all subsets of outputs in the equation

Pr [K(D1 ) ∈ S] 6 exp() × Pr [K(D2 ) ∈ S] + δ ,

(2.2)

when the value of δ = 0, the above equation represents an -differential privacy guarantee


[51].

2.2.3

Local differential privacy

So far, we have talked about centralized data privacy models, where we have a trusted data
administrator who can directly access private data and we have assumed that the adversary
only has access to the output of the algorithm. But what if we trust no one to look at our
data? Local differential privacy comes into play in such scenarios. It enables an agent to
answer questions in a differentially-private manner about their own data, without sharing
it with anyone else. Each individual possesses its own data element i.e. a database of size
1, and answers questions about it only in a differentially-private manner [25]. Consider the
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database x ∈ N |X | is a collection of n elements from some domain X , and each xi ∈ x
is held by an individual. The xi ’s are sampled independently from some distribution Pv
where v ∈ {0, 1}. A statistical privatization mechanism Qi is a conditional distribution
that maps xi ∈ X randomly to yi ∈ Y, where Y is an output possibly larger than X . The
yi ’s are referred to as the privatized views of xi ’s.
Definition 2.2.5. -local differential privacy For a given non-negative , we say that a
mechanism Q is -locally differentially-private if
(S|xi = x)
≤ e
0)
0
(S|x
=
x
i
S∈σ(Y),x,x ∈X
sup

(2.3)

where σ(Y) denotes an appropriate σ-field on Y [43][20].

2.2.4

Composition Properties of Differential Privacy

Any sequence of computations that each provides differential privacy in isolation also
provides differential privacy in sequence, which is known as sequential composition.
Lemma 1. Sequential composition [59]. Let each algorithm Ai provide i -differential
P
privacy. A sequence of Ai (D) over the dataset D provides ( i i )-differential privacy. 
If the sequence of computations is conducted on disjoint datasets, the privacy cost does
not accumulate but depends on only the worst guarantee of all the compositions. This is
known as parallel composition.
Lemma 2. Parallel composition [59]. Let each algorithm Ai provide i -differential privacy. A sequence of Ai (D) over a set of disjoint datasets D provides i -differential privacy.
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2.3

Suffix Tree

Genomic data can be represented in a more compact way in terms of a suffix tree. Suffix
trees are a space efficient data structure to store a string that allows many kinds of queries
to be answered quickly. These are very efficient for searching large sequences like a
genome [28] [57]. A suffix tree groups sequences with the same suffix into the same branch,
such that every path from root to leaf in a tree represents a suffix. Let S denote a string,
the length of which is k. Let S[i, j] denote the substring of S from position i to position j.
Before constructing the suffix tree, we concatenate a new character, $ to S. The importance
of this character is twofold. First, by adding it to the string, we can avoid that a suffix will
be a prefix of another suffix, which is undesirable. Second, the generalization is also made
easier by this operation. We always consider a fixed size sequence. A sequence S 0 = AT $
is a suffix of a sequence S = AGAT $. We formally define a suffix tree below.
Definition 2.3.1. Suffix Tree: A suffix tree T of a genomic data is a rooted, directed tree.
The edges of the suffix tree are labeled with nucleotide type A, C, G, T . On a path from the
root to the leaf, one can read the suffix of the string and a $ sign. We call a leaf w reachable
from the node v, if there is a directed path from v to w.



Example 2.3.1. Consider the sequence S = ACT CAG$ in Table 2.1. Suffix Tree : a tree
of all possible suffixes of S as shown in Figure 2.3.
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Table 2.1: All possible suffixes of the sequence ACT CAG$
Suffix
ACTCAG$
CTCAG$
TCAG$
CAG$
AG$
G$
$

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

$
T

7

C

C

A

C

G

T

G
$

A

6

T

A
G

$

C

$
C

G

5

A

G
$
4

A

G

3

G
$

$
2

1

Figure 2.3: The tree of all possible suffixes of the sequence ACT CAG$, where each path
from root to leaf represents a unique suffix.
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Chapter 3

LITERATURE REVIEW

In this chapter, we elaborate the related work, and condense the comparative information
into Table 3.1 alongside our proposed work.

3.1

Privacy-Preserving Data Publishing

This related line of work studies how to transform raw data into a version that is immunized
against privacy attacks but that still supports effective data mining tasks. It seeks to publish
private data in a manner that maintains as much utility as possible while accomplishing
the goal of anonymization. Figure 3.1 shows privacy-preserving data publishing in a noninteractive framework. In the data collection phase, the data publisher collects data from
record owners/individuals (e.g., Jake, Bob). In the data publishing phase, the data publisher
utilizes a differentially-private anonymizer to achieve anonymization and publishes the
collected data to data recipients, who will then perform data mining tasks on the published
dataset.

3.1.1

Genomic Data

Genomic data refers to the genome and DNA data of an organism which is used in bio
informatics for collecting, storing and processing the genomes of living things. Although,
Genome-Wide Association Studies (GWAS) are used for analysis of sets of DNA sequences
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to discover and identify the genetic basis of disease, these statistics that are published as
the result of GWAS can be used for identification of the participating individuals. This has
led to research on publishing GWAS data in a differentially-private manner. The papers
[6] [94] [88] [64] [81] [26] [37] list a number of mechanisms to achieve differential privacy
on genomic data. Akgün et al. [6] have categorized previously identified problems and
their respective solutions introduced in research prior to theirs. Some of the problems and
their solution techniques discussed by paper [6] are discussed in the following paragraphs
in this sub-section.
Wang et al. [88] introduce an approach to disseminate differentially-private genomic
data using top down specialization. This method assumes a data owner has a data table
D(Ai , Asnp ) where Ai are explicit identifiers and Asnp a set of SNPs. The algorithm
aims to satisfy -differential privacy while retaining data utility with a high sensitivity and
generates an anonymized data table D̂ that can be released to the public. Uhler et al. [81]
introduce methods that focus on releasing differentially-private minor allele frequencies,
p-values, and χ2 statistics for the M most relevant SNPs regardless of arbitrary external
information. They also apply penalized logical regression techniques while maintaining
differential privacy guarantees to locate genome-wide associations in the data. Finally, for
testing the approach, the proposed techniques are compared both on simulation data and on
real canine hair length genomic data. This approach is an adaptation of Bhaskar et al. [8] to
genome wide association studies. Yu et al. [94] and Yu & Ji [94] extend the work of Uhler
et al. [81] by allowing for an arbitrary number of cases and controls and performance
of a risk-utility analysis. Risk-utility analysis is used for assessment of performance of
the proposed methods. This analysis is performed on real datasets that consist of DNA
samples collected by the Wellcome Trust Case Control Consortium. Next, the methods
proposed are compared to the differentially-private publishing mechanism proposed by
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Johnson and Shmatikov [41]. The work of Li et al. [54] introduces the compressive
mechanism, which uses a probabilistic compression procedure that generates a synopsis,
adds Laplace noise to the compressed data, and then decodes the results. Compared to other
synopsis proposals, the compressive sensing mechanism provides more accurate statistical
query results while using less noise under certain conditions. Building upon this work,
Roozgard et al. [72] presents a compressed sensing based, differentially-private genomic
data dissemination algorithm that takes sequences of genomic nucleotides from multiple
subjects, and transforms the frequencies of SNPs into a sparse vector representation. The
Laplace noise is then added to all elements of the sparse vector. Jiang et al. [40] suggest a
method for releasing the top-K most significant SNPs across the genome when K is small.
In the past, various studies like [26] and [37] have led to recent mechanisms for publishing differentially-private data. Naveed et al. [64] also surveyed the field and discussed
various techniques that have been used in previous studies and the mechanisms proposed
for achieving differential privacy on genomic datasets. Although these approaches are

Figure 3.1: Differentially-Private Data Publishing
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related to PPDP with respect to genomic data, none of them publishes a suffix tree. Our
proposed approach publishes a differentially-private suffix tree, which is the most efficient
data structure for genomic data search and at the same time supports effective data mining
tasks. A comparative evaluation of our approach with the related work done in this field is
represented in the Table 3.1.

3.1.2

Non Genomic Data

Mohammed et al. [62] propose a generalization-based sanitization algorithm for relational
data with the goal of classification analysis. Chen et al. [14] propose a probabilistic
top-down partitioning algorithm for set-valued data. Xiao et al. [92] propose a wavelettransformation based approach for relational data to lower the magnitude of noise, rather
than adding independent Laplace noise. Several available PPDP techniques, such as kanonymity [74] [78] [49] [90] [60] [50], l-diversity [97] [55], and t-closeness [53] [76]
exist, each having their own merits and based on varying assumptions about the background
knowledge of an attacker. Typically, such techniques utilize one or more anonymization
techniques such as generalization, bucketization, and slicing. Publishing data with kanonymous privacy guarantees the record of an individual is indistinguishable from at least
(k-1) others’ as it anonymizes data by generalizing quasi identifiers. Since k-anonymity
assumes that each record represents a distinct individual, it provides little privacy to a
group of k records being owned by fewer than k owners. To overcome this issue in
k-anonymity, (X,Y)-anonymity [83] was introduced. k-anonymity based privacy models
rely on the formation of a group, but if the records in the assigned group consist of sensitive
attributes having similar values, the adversary could perform an attribute linkage attack i.e.
infer an individual’s sensitive value based on the values received from the entire group
and singling out the individual, thereby eliminating privacy guarantees. To avoid this,
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privacy-preserving models that could potentially defend against attribute linkage attacks
were proposed.
One of these contributions was l-diversity, which guarantees privacy by mandating that
every quasi-identifier group will have at least l sensitive attributes. In papers [55] [47] [48]
and [86], techniques were proposed to achieve l-diversity and recursive (c,l)-diversity (an
improvement over l-diversity). While l-diversity is a significant improvement over kanonymity, it has its own drawbacks–each sensitive attribute taking values uniformly being
one of them. To avoid this, other privacy models were proposed to prevent attribute linkage
that could be achieved even in l-diversity. These include confidence bounding [85] [84],
(X,Y)-privacy [83], (α,k)-anonymity [90], (k,e)-anonymity [96] and t-closeness [53] [76].
One of the most noteworthy of them being t-closeness, implemented by [53] [76] [11] [70] [52]
which provides good privacy guarantee in the published data. In addition to these models,
other privacy models were researched to provide privacy guarantees in cases where previous models would fail. Such as a case where an attacker may not know an individual’s
record in the dataset, but may confidently be able to infer the presence or absence of an individual’s record in the published data. A number of other privacy models were implemented
to overcome the table linkage attack and to reduce an attacker’s probabilistic belief about an
individual in the published data. The authors in [13] introduced the (c,t)-isolation privacy
model, other techniques that provided privacy guarantees such as δ-presence [66] [65],
(d,γ)-privacy [68] and distributional privacy [9] were employed.
Graph Data: Graph data is a dataset that employs graph structures where the nodes are
connected to each other by edges and therefore possess the property to store and represent
data. Based on the type of neighboring graphs to which differential privacy is applied
before publishing, edge differential privacy and node differential privacy were introduced
by [34]. They indicated that node differential privacy, though it provides a stronger privacy
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guarantee by aiming to achieve node differential privacy for publishing graph data, it may
compromise the utility of the published data. Therefore, numerous research for publishing
graph data intend to achieve edge differential privacy instead.

Edge Differential Privacy: Considering a graph G1 , the neighboring possible graphs
include the ones in which an arbitrary edge is either added or removed compared to G1 .
Achieving differential privacy, in these neighboring graphs is called edge differential privacy.

Definition 3.1.1. [34] Edge Differential Privacy. Let G1 = (V1 ,E1 ) and G2 = (V2 ,E2 ) be a
pair of graphs where V1 = V2 and E2 = E1 - (υ1 ,υ2 ) such that (υ1 ,υ2 ) is the edge they differ
on. A randomized function K achieves (,n)–edge differential privacy, if for all graphs G1
and G2 differing on at most |(υ1 ,υ2 )| = n edges and where S is all the sets of answers,

Pr [K(G1 ) ∈ S] 6 exp() × Pr [K(G2 ) ∈ S]

where the parameter  represents the privacy budget.



A number of researchers have focused their research for publishing graphs via edge
differential privacy; however, some research [80] also discusses the addition or removal of
n-arbitrary edges from the graph G1 as a representation of edge differential privacy.

Node Differential Privacy: Considering a graph G1 , the neighboring possible graphs
include the graph in which a node and all the edges connected to that node are either added
or removed compared to G1 . Achieving differential privacy, in these neighboring graphs is
called node differential privacy.
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Definition 3.1.2. [34] Node Differential Privacy. Let G1 = (V1 ,E1 ) and G2 = (V2 ,E2 ) be a
pair of graphs where V2 = V1 - υ and E2 = E1 - (υ1 ,υ2 ) | υ1 = υ ∨ υ2 = υ such that υ ∈ V1 .
A randomized function K achieves (,n) - node differential privacy, if for all graphs G1 and
G2 differing on one node and it’s connecting edges and where S is all the sets of answers,

Pr [K(G1 ) ∈ S] 6 exp() × Pr [K(G2 ) ∈ S]

where the parameter  is the desired privacy budget.



Although we have defined node differential privacy, we note that achieving node differential privacy is difficult in cases of high sensitivity, where a particular node has a
connection with all other nodes in the graph, thus providing insufficient utility on the
published data.
Next, we discuss various approaches for differentially-private data publishing for graph
data, which guarantee edge differential privacy [63] [73] [44] [80], node differential privacy
[46], or miscellaneous methods [5] [15] [91] to achieve differential privacy for publishing
graph or synthetic data. In addition to data publishing, we include approaches for publishing results to queries that have not been clearly stated to be interactive or non-interactive
query models, where a non-interactive query model lets the data publishers publish the
results to all queries at once.
Mülle et al. [63] propose a graph clustering approach that guarantees (,1)-edge differential privacy. This approach does not deal with the publishing of graphs, but it is
applied to publish usable graph clustering results under a differential privacy guarantee.
The proposed PIG (privacy-integrated graph) consists of two steps: perturbation of the
input graph PIGpert and a graph clustering algorithm applied to the perturbed graph. The
authors introduced a PIG clustering approach, which perturbs the input graph by perturbing
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the adjacency matrix of the graph based on the value of , and applies a graph clustering
approach to the perturbed graph. Perturbation consists of a combination of edge sampling
and edge flipping (edge randomization), and the algorithm introduces a privacy parameter
s to choose between preservation and randomization, where (s ∈ [0, 1]). Next, the approach employs graph clustering by enacting PIG with two graph clustering approaches:
SCAN [93] and graph k-medoids [69]
Sala et al. [73] introduce a differentially-private graph model Pygmalion, to maintain
a trade-off between privacy and the similarity to the original graph data while publishing
it in a differentially-private manner. The authors state that the addition of significant noise
to apply differential privacy might disrupt the graph structure. The partitioning approach
discussed in the paper [73] provides a strong privacy guarantee while publishing a less
noisy graph. The original graph is converted into dK − 2 degree distributions of itself, and
differential privacy is applied by adding noise to these dK − 2 distributions. The authors
develop a degree-based clustering algorithm, which partitions the statistical representation
of a graph. By maintaining -differential privacy within each cluster, -differential privacy
is achieved over the entire dataset. Finally, the added noise is evenly distributed, to reduce
the effective errors by applying isotonic regression.
Task and Clifton [80] introduce a new differential privacy guarantee for graph data
called out-link privacy, which provides a strong privacy guarantee when a small amount
of noise is added. Here, an attacker possessing a record will not be able to determine
the presence or absence of a person in the survey from which the published graph was
produced. The high-degree nodes of the graph are better protected in out-link privacy
than in edge privacy, as all relationships cited by a popular person are protected, and even
when other nodes may be linked to a node the mutuality of the relationship can be denied.
The paper introduces two techniques for implementing out-link privacy, which apply an
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ego-network analysis [56]. This ego-network analysis works by answering queries noninteractively, which could result in noisy data if edge or node differential privacy were
applied. The ego-network analysis approach is employed to analyze social network data
based on individuals whose records are present in the social network.
The first algorithm results in a dataset from which out-degree and clustering data can
be extracted based on the ego-network. The second algorithm then produces the social
cohesion patterns among individuals in the network. The third algorithm privatizes the
centrality data, and results in a popularity graph that represents the social circles of influential individuals in the data. The authors apply Laplace noise to the edge weights
when an individual adds or removes their records, based on the sensitivity. Finally, when
post-processing the data the edges with low weights are eliminated, which results in a
weighted popularity graph being published.
Although graph data publishing under node differential privacy guarantee has several
issues concerning the utility of published data, Day et al. [18] propose approaches for
publishing the node degree distribution of a graph using node differential privacy. The two
proposed approaches each employ aggregation and a cumulative histogram for publishing
the node degree distribution of a graph using graph projection. This technique ensures
that the graph is θ-degree bounded, i.e., when the graph is projected, a smaller value of θ
indicates that more edges are pruned, while a greater value leads to the addition of more
noise. The authors propose a series of algorithms and sub-algorithms for publishing degree
histograms under node differential privacy. Of these, the (θ,Ω)-histogram and θ-cumulative
histogram approaches are based on sensitivity bounds. For the selection of input parameters
for these algorithms, the authors introduce low-sensitivity quality functions. Based on
the results obtained by applying the proposed technique to real-world graph datasets, the
authors conclude that this approach significantly reduces the error of approximating the
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degree distribution.
Ahmed et al. [5], propose a mechanism based on a random projection approach, which
in turn employs random matrix theory to reduce the dimensions of the adjacency matrix,
and therefore achieve differential privacy with the addition of less noise. Next, the authors prove that their mechanism is able to achieve differential privacy, and also list the
theoretical error bounds for approximating the top k eigenvectors. Finally, the authors test
the utility of the published data for two applications that require spectral information of
a graph, and compare their proposed mechanism with Wang et al. [86], which perturbs
the eigenvector of the original data directly by introducing Laplace noise. Through this
comparison, the authors conclude that the performance of their mechanism is viable.
Chen et al. [15] claim that previous research indicated differential privacy is vulnerable to data correlation, and therefore it cannot be applied to network data that may be
correlated. They claim that introducing a parameter that measures the extent of correlation
could help to provide differential privacy guarantees in correlated network data. The first
step is to generate a private vertical labeling for a given network dataset, to make the
corresponding adjacency matrix generate clusters. These dense clusters of the adjacency
matrix are identified in the next step using partitioning. Finally, the Exponential mechanism
is employed to generate the noisy adjacency matrix.
Xiao et al. [91] introduce an approach for releasing network data from information
networks in a differentially-private manner. The proposed approach is based on the observation that instead of considering the edges directly the connection probabilities between
vertices are estimated, then the noise that needs to be added by differential privacy is significantly reduced. A statistical hierarchal random graph (HRG) [17] model is employed
in the proposed model to infer the structure of the network. The proposed mechanism
samples possible HRG structures using MCMC (Markov chain Monte Carlo) to guarantee
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differential privacy. The authors theoretically proved that the sensitivity is lower when an
inference is performed on the network data published by the proposed mechanism.
However, these approaches cannot be directly applied to genomic data, as the genomic data is highly sensitive and hence requires careful processing. We use differential
privacy [21] [23] [24] [16] [14] [75] [92] to address privacy-preserving genomic data
publishing.

3.2

Privacy-Preserving Data Mining

In this related line of work, the raw data is first anonymized while maintaining an effective
level of data utility, and then released for the purpose of data mining and analysis. The
data owners jointly compute a data mining function on their private data, and only learn
the correct output and nothing else. Figure 3.2 shows privacy-preserving data mining in
an interactive framework. In the data collection phase, the data owner collects data from
record owners/individuals (e.g., Jake, Bob). In the data mining phase, the data owner
answers queries posed by data recipients and returns differentially-private results.

3.2.1

Genomic Data

There has been ample ongoing research to provide access to published/unpublished datasets
while maintaining differential privacy. Other than publishing the data in a differentiallyprivate manner, a data miner/analyst could pose queries to the data owner interactively
and non-interactively. While answering non-interactive queries, the system is aware of all
the queries that will be posed by the data miner in advance and it can take appropriate
measures to make the data private. But in the case of interactive queries, the system would
respond to the ad-hoc queries without any knowledge of the queries or any insight into
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the future. Privacy-preserving query processing is the task wherein, the queries posed
over the statistical data are answered by injecting random noise to each of the responses to
guarantee the privacy of an individual. This randomness hides the presence or absence of an
individual in the data, while maximizing the accuracy of the responses to the posed queries.
The techniques to achieve privacy-preserving data mining (PPDM), privacy-preserving
data analysis and privacy-preserving data publishing (discussed in this thesis) under differential privacy have been widely studied. Privacy-preserving data mining is the task of
mining information from a dataset wherein the data owner is responsible for maintaining
the privacy guarantees in the results sent to the data miner.
Atallah et al. [7] introduce a privacy preserving sequence comparison algorithm by
modifying the edit-distance protocol. Szajda et al. [79] propose a practical data privacy
scheme based on modifying the Smith Waterman sequence comparison algorithm. Johnson
& Shmatikov [41] propose an algorithm to perform privacy preserving computation of
the location of SNPs and p-value associated with a disease, and measures of correlations
between SNPs. De Cristofaro et al. [19] present a private substring matching protocol to
conduct a test in which no other information is learned by the conducting parties.

3.2.2

Non Genomic Data

Agrawal & Srikant [4] develop the idea of building accurate models about aggregated
data without access to precise information in individual data records. The major approaches of PPDM include perturbation, anonymization, and crytptographical techniques.
Hardt & Rothblum [33] introduce a differentially-private multiplicative weights mechanism application to privacy preserving data analysis. Important privacy preserving statistical analysis methods such as logistic regression have been introduced by following
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Figure 3.2: Privacy-Preserving Data Mining
papers [12] [94] [81]. There is much overlap in the field of PPDP and PPDM and many of
the techniques can be applied to both purposes.
Table 3.1 shows the comparative evaluation of our approach with the related work done
in this field. Data publishing to interested data recipients is accomplished via interactive
or non-interactive frameworks. In an interactive framework, the data miners ask the query
to which the data publisher responds by returning the differential private result. A certain
budget is consumed for each query asked by the data miners. Therefore, data miners can
only ask queries based on the budget they possess (Figure 3.2). In a non-interactive framework, the data publisher publishes the anonymized dataset and the miners can query the
dataset to obtain differentially-private results. Our work is focused on privacy-preserving
data publishing.

Wang et al. [88]
Roozgardet al. [72]
Uhler et al. [81]
Yu et al. [95]
Jiang et al. [40]
Atallah et al. [7]
Szajda et al. [79]
Johnson and Shmatikov [42]
Cristofaro et al. [19]
Our proposed solution
[Chapter 4]

Approach
PPDM Suffix
Tree

Domain

Differential Syntactic PPDP
Privacy
Privacy

Privacy Model

Hierarchical Sparse Others
Vector

Data Release

Table 3.1: Comparative evaluation of main features in related approaches including our proposed approach (properties in
columns are positioned as beneficial with fulfillment denoted by )
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Chapter 4

PROPOSED ALGORITHM

Let D is the genomic data that contains n sequences {S1 , . . . , Sn }, where each sequence
contains a number of SNPs, for example, S1 = AGAT . To achieve differential privacy, the
principal approach is to perturb the true output by adding a random noise to it. To generate
the noise according to Laplace distribution we need to determine the privacy budget B
beforehand. The suffix tree is one of the most important and widely used data structures in
bio-informatics and comparative genomics. It is a special data structure with a wide range
of applications, including exact matching problems, substring problems, data compression
and circular strings. A suffix tree is crucially important in sequencing and investigating
DNA, such as looking for the longest common substring of two DNA sequences and
finding exact and inexact matchings of a sample in a long sequence. In computational
biology, molecular biology and bio-informatics these problems are crucially important. In
our approach, we aim to generate a differentially-private suffix tree T that will support
count queries. Count queries, as a general data analysis task, are the building block of
many data mining tasks. We denote by user count query any data mining’s count query that
attempts to answer the following question: how many times a specific pattern u occurs in
the data, i.e., suffix-tree T ?
In this chapter, we first present an overview of our proposed privacy-preserving approach for publishing a differentially-private genomic suffix tree. We then elaborate the
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key steps in each algorithm. The objective of our solution is to publish a suffix tree from
raw genomic data using differential privacy while maintaining utility. Given a genomic data
D containing sequential genomic data sequences {S1 , . . . , Sn } and given a privacy budget
B and height h, our approach constructs a partitioning tree P with height h, normalizes it
using a bottom-up approach, and then generates a differentially-private suffix tree T . Our
solution consists of four algorithms:
Algorithm 1 - Differentially-Private Genomic Data Publishing: It is the main algorithm that calls the algorithms 2, 3 and 4 to construct a differentially-private suffix tree
from the genomic data D. To ensure privacy and an efficient search for genomic data,
a differentially-private suffix tree using Laplace mechanism is constructed over the raw
genomic data.
Algorithm 2 - Differentially-Private Partitioning Tree Generation: This algorithm
efficiently generates suffixes of raw genomic data sequences by constructing a differentiallyprivate partitioning tree.
Algorithm 3 - Bottom-Up Normalization: To ensure the consistency and utility of the
output genomic data, a bottom-up approach is used to normalize the partitioning tree based
on a proposed utility constraint.
Algorithm 4 - Suffix Tree Generation: This algorithm uses a top-down approach
to generate a B-differentially-private suffix tree from the normalized partitioning tree to
support count queries for genomic sequence matching.

4.1

Differentially-Private Genomic Data Publishing

This main algorithm takes as input a raw genomic data D, which contains sequences
{S1 , . . . , Sn } such that the length of i-th sequence |Si | = ki , a privacy budget B and a
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user-specified height h, and returns a suffix tree T satisfying B-differential privacy, as
shown in Algorithm 1. In Step 1, it calls Algorithm 2 to construct a noisy partitioning tree
P using Laplace noise and the specialization threshold θ. In Step 2, Algorithm 3 is called,
which takes as input a differentially-private partitioning tree P, and normalizes P based
on the utility constraint to maintain the usefulness of the outputted normalized partitioning
tree P̂. In Step 3, Algorithm 4 is executed to construct a differentially-private suffix tree T
based on the differentially-private suffixes obtained from the normalized partitioning tree
P̂. In Step 4, the algorithm outputs a differentially-private suffix tree T .
Algorithm 1 Differentially-Private Genomic Data Publishing
Differentially-Private Genomic Data Publishing Algorithm
Input: Genomic Data D = {S1 , . . . , Sn }
Input: Privacy Budget B
Input: Height of the tree h
Output: Differentially-private suffix tree T
1. Execute Algorithm 2 to construct a partitioning tree P based on D and B.
2. Execute Algorithm 3 to normalize P according to the utility constraint 4.3.1
3. Execute Algorithm 4 to construct a differentially-private suffix tree T from P̂.
4. Return suffix tree T .

4.2

Partitioning Tree Generation

In this phase, our approach is to generate differentially-private suffixes to ensure privacypreserving data publishing. Our strategy for generating suffixes in a differentially-private
manner is to use a top-down approach based on constructing disjoint partitions for multiple
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levels using Laplace mechanism and the specialization threshold θ. Therefore, we construct
a partitioning tree P by recursively grouping sequences in D into disjoint sub-datasets
based on their suffixes. Given a raw genomic data D = {S1 , . . . , Sn }, privacy budget B
and user specified height h, the algorithm generates a differentially-private partitioning tree
P. Each partition contains four values: the nucleotide type, the suffix, sequences containing
the suffix and the noisy count associated with it as described in Definition 4.2.1. In Step 1,
p
we compute the specialization threshold θ = c∗2 2h/Bl (two times the standard deviation
of noise) [14], where c is a constant that will be determined through experiments, h is the
height of the tree and Bl is the privacy budget per level.
Step 2 creates a virtual root partition r, where a partition is a data structure formally
defined as follows.
Definition 4.2.1. Partition. A partition is a tuple with four values [Nuc, UNuc, Seqs,
NCount], where:
• Nucleotide (Nuc) is a type of bases - adenine, guanine, thymine, and cytosine A, G,
T, C in a strand of DNA.
• UNuc keeps track of the suffixes of Seqs = {S1 , . . . , Sn } for each child partition.
• Seqs = {S1 , . . . , Sn } is the set of sequences that ends with the suffix UNuc.
• NCount is the noisy count which is the summation of count of sequences Seqs and
Laplace noise.



All sequences in D are initially assigned to r.Seqs, r.U N uc is set to Any, and r.UNuc
and r.NCount are set to Null. In Step 3, for each nucleotide type A, G, T and C, we create
child partition v for r. For each child partition v, we assign v.N uc as the nucleotide type
and v.U N uc as v.N uc ∪ P arent(v).U N uc. For each sequence, if v.U N uc is a suffix of
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√
S, then we assign it to v.Seqs. The variance of the Laplace noise is 2 ∗ ∆f /(Bl − Bl ),
√
where ∆f is the sensitivity and (Bl − Bl ) is the privacy budget used for partitioning. The
sensitivity ∆f in our algorithm is upper bounded by h i.e., the height of the tree. The noisy
count associated with each partition is the sum of the true count and the Laplace noise. To
build P, we use a uniform budget allocation scheme. We divide the total privacy budget
B equally, i.e., the privacy budget used per level for constructing P is Bl = B/h. One
important observation is that all partitions at the same level contain disjoint sequence sets,
and therefore the privacy budget allocated to a level can be used in full for each partition
in it. In Step 5, for each child partition v created in Step 3, we continue to create further
child partitions if v.N count ≥ θ for that partition and the height h > 0. Step 6 outputs a
differentially-private partitioning tree P.
Example 4.2.1. Consider the sequences {S1 , ...., S6 } shown in Figure 1.1 as the input
sequences. Initially the algorithm creates one root partition r, where r.N uc is set to Any,
r.U N uc is set to null, r.Seqs contains all the input sequences S1 , S2 , S3 , S4 , S5 , S6 and
r.N Count is set to null. At level 1, the algorithm creates four new child partitions A, G, T
and C of r, as shown in Figure 4.1. The sequences with corresponding suffixes will be
assigned to the respective partitions. As none of the sequences has A or C as the suffix,
therefore, the partitions with suffixes A and C will be assigned as null in Seqs, the partition
with suffix G will contain S2 , S4 , S5 , S6 and the partition with suffix T will contain S1 , S3 .
For level 1, θ = 35 and N Count for the partition with suffix G is 40 ≥ 35, therefore we
will further create the child partitions for G. Similarly, depending on the noisy count of
each partition, we decide whether to create further partitions or not until h > 0.



Privacy Budget Allocation: B-differential privacy can be achieved by applying a
differentially-private mechanism, commonly Laplace mechanism [23], that consumes a
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Algorithm 2 Differentially-Private Partitioning Tree Generation
Differentially-Private Partitioning Tree Generation Algorithm
Input: Genomic Data D = {S1 , . . . , Sn }
Input: Privacy Budget B
Input: Height of the tree h
Output: Differentially-private partitioning tree P
p
1. Compute the specialization threshold θ = c ∗ 2 2h/Bl , where h is the height of
the tree.
2. Construct a partitioning tree P with a virtual root partition r:
(a) Assign all sequences in D to r: r.Seqs = {S1 , . . . , Sn }
(b) Set nucleotide r.N uc to Any.
(c) Set r.U N uc and noisy count r.N Count to Null.
3. For each nucleotide type A, C, G and T , create a child partition v:
(a) Set v.N uc to the nucleotide type.
(b) Set v.U N uc to v.N uc ∪ P arent(v).U N uc.
(c) For each sequence S in P arent(v).Seqs, assign S to v.Seqs iff v.U N uc is
a suffix of S.
√
(d) Generate Laplace noise Lnoise = Lap(2 × h/(Bl − Bl )).
(e) Set v.N Count to |v.Seqs| + Lnoise , where |v.Seqs| is the number of
sequences assigned to partition v.
4. h ← h − 1.
5. While h > 0, for each child partition v created in Step 3, if v.N Count ≥ θ, then
repeat Steps 3 and 4.
6. Return P.

privacy budget B and calibrates noise according to the global sensitivity ∆(f ) of a function
f. To address the existing utility and privacy trade-off, a geometric mechanism [27] was
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proposed which is a factor of an optimal mechanism Mu that is user-independent for every
user u [10]. As in our approach, we will be normalizing the generated partitioning tree P
so that leaf nodes would be least noisy, therefore, to construct partitions at each level, we
employ a uniform budget allocation scheme. That is, the privacy budget allocated to each
level l is Bl = B/h, which is used for constructing partitions at level l in P, as well as to
compute the specialization threshold θ.
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Figure 4.1: Partitioning Tree: At level 1, the algorithm creates four new partitions A, G, T
and C of the root partition. The partition with suffix G contains S2 , S4 , S5 , S6 and the
partition with suffix T contains S1 , S3 . At level 1, since θ is 35, and N Count for partition
with suffix G is 40, which is ≥ 35, therefore we create the child partition for partition with
suffix G. Similarly, we create child partitions until the height h > 0.

Sensitivity Analysis: The sensitivity of a function is defined as the maximum difference in the function output when one single element in the function domain is modified.
If sensitivity is low, that means, the presence or absence of an individual will change
the outcome very little, so less noise needs to be added in order to ensure privacy and
vice-versa.

Lemma 3. The sensitivity of our algorithm is upper bounded by h.
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Proof: In the output suffix tree, if a sequence is modified, which means we add, delete
or replace one or more nucleotide; then the maximum number of suffixes in a suffix tree
that will be affected is at most k, where k is the length of the sequence. However, the
maximum length of a sequence that we will be inserting in a final suffix tree based on our
algorithm is h, where h is the height of the tree. Therefore, the overall sensitivity of our
algorithm is upper bounded by h.

4.3



Bottom-Up Normalization

To ensure the utility (usefulness) and consistency of the data, a bottom-up approach is
proposed to normalize the partitioning tree based on the following utility constraint.
Definition 4.3.1. Utility Constraint. The noisy count N Count of any node v in the partitioning tree P should be greater or equal to the total sum of its children’s noisy counts.
That is:
∀v ∈ P, v.N Count ≥

P

u∈child(v)

u.N Count



Algorithm 3 takes the differentially-private partitioning tree P as an input and updates
the noisy count N Count of the partitions from the leaf to the root to generate a normalized
partitioning tree P̂. Following the bottom-up approach, we start with level l = h−1, where
h is the height of the differentially-private partitioning tree P. The algorithm ensures that
for each non-leaf node in P, the utility constraint holds true.
If the utility constraint described in Definition 4.3.1 is not satisfied, that is, the noisy
count of the parent is less than the sum of the noisy count of its children, then the parent’s
noisy count is updated to be the sum of the noisy count of all its children, as described in
Step 2. We keep normalizing based on the utility constraint until we reach the root partition
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Algorithm 3 Bottom-Up Normalization
Bottom-Up Normalization Algorithm
Input: Differentially-private partitioning tree P
Output: Normalized partitioning tree P̂
Apply a bottom-up approach on P to obtain a normalize partitioning tree P̂:
1. l ← h − 1, where h is the height of P.
2. For each non-leaf node v in P at level l, if the utility constraint 4.3.1 is not
satisfied, then update the noisy count of v:
P
v.N Count ← u∈child(v) u.N Count.
3. l ← l − 1.
4. While l > 0, repeat Steps 2 and 3.
5. Return P̂.

of the tree. In Step 5, a differentially-private normalized partitioning tree P̂ is produced as
an output.

Example 4.3.1. Consider the partitioning tree P in Figure 4.1. At level 3, the partition
with suffix CCG has N Count = 6 and the sum of the noisy count of its children is 8. As
this violates the utility constraint, we update N Count of the partition with suffix CCG to
8 = 2 + 1 + 3 + 2 and similarly, we update N Count of the partition with suffix CG to
15 = 2 + 4 + 1 + 8 as shown in Figure 4.2. We continue to normalize further till we reach
the root partition.
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Figure 4.2: Normalized Partitioning Tree: At level 3 in Figure 4.1, the partition with suffix
CCG has N Count = 6 and the sum of the noisy count of its children is 8. As this
violates the utility constraint, we update N Count of the partition with suffix CCG to
8 = 2 + 1 + 3 + 2 and similarly, we update N Count of the partition with suffix CG to
15 = 2 + 4 + 1 + 8 as shown in Figure 4.2. We continue to normalize further following
bottom-up approach until level l> 0.

4.4

Suffix Tree Generation

This algorithm takes as an input the normalized partitioning tree P̂, and based on a topdown approach it outputs the B-differentially-private suffix tree T . In the normalized
partitioning tree, U.N uc represents the suffix and N Count represents the normalized noisy
count. We traverse the normalized partitioning tree level-wise and create a branch in the
suffix tree for each suffix present in P̂. Starting with level 1, for each partition v in P̂
as depicted in Figure 4.2, we use the suffix present in v.U N uc and its corresponding
v.N Count to create a tree branch in the suffix tree T , as shown in Figure 4.3, and add
the associated noisy count at the end. For each added branch, we append the dollar sign $
equal to the noisy count v.N Count. Every path from the root to the square node represents
a suffix. Because the tree is normalized, there is no violation of utility constraint when we
take the parent suffix and add it to the suffix tree i.e., following a top-down approach. Since,
the noisy count of the parent partition is always greater than or equal to the noisy count of its
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Algorithm 4 Suffix Tree Generation
Suffix Tree Generation Algorithm
Input: Normalized partitioning tree P̂
Output: Differentially-private suffix tree T
Apply a top-down approach on P̂ to obtain a differentially-private suffix tree T :
1. Set the initial level: l ← 1.
2. For each node v in P̂ at level l:
(a) Use v.U N uc sequence to create a tree branch in T .
(b) Append v.N Count dollar signs $ to the added branch.
3. l ← l + 1.
4. While l ≤ h, where h is the height of P̂, then repeat Steps 2 and 3.
5. Return T .

children, the suffixes maintain consistency. Step 5 outputs a differentially-private suffix tree
T that supports count queries for genomic sequence matching and maintains data utility.
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Figure 4.3: Differentially-Private Suffix Tree: It is generated from normalized partitioning
tree P̂ shown in Figure 4.2
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Chapter 5

ALGORITHM ANALYSIS

In this chapter, we perform the privacy and complexity analysis of our proposed approach.

5.1

Privacy Analysis

We use the composition properties of differential privacy to guarantee that the proposed
algorithm satisfies B-differential privacy as a whole. Any sequence of computations that
each provides differential privacy in isolation also provides differential privacy in sequence,
which is known as sequential composition.
Lemma 4. Sequential composition [59]. Let each Ai provide Bi -differential privacy. A
P
sequence of Ai (D) over the dataset D provides ( i Bi )-differential privacy.

However, if the sequence of computations is conducted on disjoint datasets, the privacy
cost does not accumulate but depends on only the worst guarantee of all the compositions.
This is known as parallel composition.
Lemma 5. Parallel composition [59]. Let each Ai provide Bi -differential privacy. A
sequence of Ai (D) over a set of disjoint datasets D provides Bi -differential privacy.



Proposition 5.1.1. Given a privacy budget B, our algorithm generates a B-differentiallyprivate genomic suffix tree.
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Proof: Our proposed algorithm consists of three phases - partitioning tree generation,
bottom-up normalization and suffix tree generation. We have a fanout f = 4. According
to the Lemma 5, we can use the same privacy budget for each partition at the same level.
Therefore, if we can prove that the summation of the privacy budget used in each partitioning level is less than or equal to B, we get the conclusion that our approach satisfies
B-differential privacy.
In the partitioning tree generation phase of our algorithm, the allocation of the privacy
budget per level is Bl = B/h, where h is the height of the partitioning tree P. The privacy
√
budget needed for computing the specialization threshold θ is Bl . As all the partitions
on the same level in the partitioning contain disjoint sets of sequences, according to the
Lemma 4, the total privacy budget for each partition to build the noisy partitioning tree P
√
is Bl − Bl . The only time we refer to the original data is when we compute the total count
of the sequences in each partition, and as mentioned above, for each partition we compute
√
Bl − Bl privacy budget. For the bottom-up normalization and the suffix tree generation
phase, no privacy budget is consumed as we are not utilizing the original data. Therefore,
the total privacy budget consumed can be formulated as:
h
X
l=1

p
p
(Bl − Bl ) + Bl = h × Bl ≤ B
| {z } |{z}
partition

threshold

As proven by Hay et al. [35], a post-processing of differentially-private results remains
differential private. Therefore, our approach satisfies B-differential privacy.

5.2



Complexity Analysis

Proposition 5.2.1. (Complexity). The overall complexity of our proposed approach in the
average case is O(h2 × n).
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Proof. We can determine the time complexity of the proposed approach in terms of
three phases: Partitioning tree generation, Normalization and Suffix tree generation.
Partitioning tree generation phase. In the partitioning tree generation phase, the
runtime complexity is: the cost of generating each partition, times the number of partitions
in the tree. For each level l of the partitioning tree, the maximum number of possible
P
partitions in the worst case is 4l , and the total number is hl=1 4l . However, the use of
the specialization threshold θ restricts the exponential growth of the partitions; θ fluctuates
according to the Laplace noise distribution, which balances the number of partitions [25].
Therefore, in the average case, the number of partitions per level is Pl ≈ 4 × l  4l , and
the total number of partitions is:
h
X

4 × l = 2 × h2

l=1

Given that we process n sequences per level, the total cost of constructing a partitioning
tree in an average case is O(n×h2 ), where, n is the number of sequences and h is the height
of the partitioning tree.
Normalization phase. In the normalization phase, we traverse the partitioning tree
once. Therefore, the total cost to construct a normalized partitioning tree in an average
P
case is: hl=1 4 × l = 2 × h2 = O(h2 ).
Suffix tree generation phase. In the suffix tree generation phase, the runtime complexity is: the time taken to insert a full sequence, times the number of sequences generated. As
stated by [82] [89] [29], a string of length h can be inserted in O(h). In the average case,
the number of full sequences to be generated from the partitioning tree is O(h), where
these full sequences will account for all the trimmed sequences (short inbuilt suffixes).
Therefore, the average computational cost to build a suffix tree is O(h × h) = O(h2 ).
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Therefore, the overall complexity of our proposed approach in the average case is:
O(h2 × n + h2 + h2 ) = O(h2 × n).



Given that h  n, we show in our experiment that our algorithm scales linearly w.r.t. a
linear increase of n.
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Chapter 6

EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION

In this chapter, we evaluate the performance of our algorithm. First, we discuss the implementation details, and then we present the experimental results that include determining the
optimal value of constant c for computing θ, scalability of query processing with respect
to the number of input sequences, efficiency with respect to the privacy budget B and the
utility with respect to the percentage of the query length. We also perform a comparative
evaluation of our proposed algorithm with differentially-private genome data dissemination
through top-down specialization algorithm [88]. We implemented our algorithm in Java,
and our experiments were conducted on a machine equipped with an Intel(R) Core(TM) i76700 CPU @ 3.40GHz processor and 32.0 GB RAM, running Windows 10 64-bit operating
system.

6.1

Datasets

The humane SNPs were obtained from the Human Genome Privacy Challenge [3]. The
chr2 and chr10 datasets contain 311 SNPs and 610 SNPs respectively. The length of the
sequences is 200. The details of the datasets is provided in Table 6.1.
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Table 6.1: Properties of Experimental Datasets
Dataset
chr2
chr10

6.2

# of SNP Sequences
311 (29504091-30044866)
610 (55127312-56292137)

Length of Sequence
200
200

Determining Optimal Value of Constant c

p
Recall that θ = c ∗ 2 2h/Bl . To determine the optimal value of constant c for the
specialization threshold θ, we randomly generate queries of varying length from the suffix
tree and experiment the data utility for different c values. We started experimenting with
a c > 0.25, and noticed that θ was too big and the condition to partition further was never
satisfied. Therefore, we experimented on c values from the range [0, 0.25]. As shown in
Figure 6.1, the best results in terms of average relative error is for c = 0.15.

Average Relative Error

60%

h = 200
B=1

50%
40%
30%

20%
10%
0%
0.1

0.15

0.2

0.25

c
Figure 6.1: Determining the optimal value of c for computing the threshold θ
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6.3

Scalability

The objective is to measure the runtime of each construction phase in order to ensure its
capability to scale up in terms of the number of sequences. We measure the runtime of our
proposed algorithm with respect to the linear increase in the number of sequences. We set
the privacy budget B to 1, the height of the tree to 200 and the value of c as 0.15. Figure 6.2
illustrates the runtime of our algorithm with respect to a linear increase in the number of
sequences in the randomized dataset (200k, 400k, 600k, 800k and 1000k records). The
x-axis represents the number of records and the y-axis shows the runtime in minutes. We
observe that the growth in total runtime is linear when the data records increase linearly.
We also observe that the partitioning tree construction phase is the most dominant phase in
the algorithm. However, all the three phases scale linearly with respect to the number of
sequences.
Partitioning Tree
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Figure 6.2: Scalability w.r.t the number of sequences

1000K
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6.4

Efficiency

We evaluate the efficiency of our proposed approach on the chr2 and chr10 dataset with
respect to the privacy budget B varying from 0.5 to 1.25 at an interval of 0.25. The x-axis
represents the privacy budget B and the y-axis represents the runtime in milliseconds as
shown in Figure 6.3. We observe that for the chr2 dataset the runtime is between 200300 milliseconds and for the chr10 dataset the runtime is between 600-700 milliseconds.
However, the runtime is consistent with the increase in B for both the datasets.
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700
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300
200
100
0
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B

Figure 6.3: Efficiency w.r.t the privacy budget B

1.25
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6.5

Utility

We measure the utility of a count query Q over the sanitized dataset D̃ by its relative error
with respect to the actual result over the raw dataset D. The relative error is computed as:

Relative Error =

|Q(D̃) − Q(D)|
max(Q(D), s)

(6.1)

where s is a sanity bound that is set to 1.
We randomly generate 500 counting queries with varying length of sequences. We divide the query set into five subsets such that the query length of the i-th subset is uniformly
√
distributed in [1, 5i k] and each query is drawn randomly, where k = 200 is the length of
the sequence . All relative errors will be computed based on the average of 10 runs.
The experimental results are generated using both datasets: chr2 and chr10. We use
500 random queries of length l ∈ [1, 14], since i = 5 in our experiments. The first
√
subset for 20% of query length is [1, 15 200], which is equal to [1,3]. Similarly, the five
uniformly distributed subsets for 20%, 40%, 60%, 80% and 100% of query length are
[1, 3], [1, 6], [1, 8], [1, 11], [1, 14] respectively. We select five random queries for each sampling and the relative error is the average of 10 runs.
Figures 6.4 and 6.5 depict the average relative error as the value of the privacy budget
B grows from 0.75 to 1.25 at an interval 0.25, and height is set to 100, 150 and 200 with
c = 0.15. The x-axis represents the maximum query length of each subset in terms of the
√
percentage of k and the y-axis represents the average relative error. We observe that the
average relative error decreases with the increase in B with respect to both the datasets,
and the best data utility is obtained for the privacy budget B = 1.25. This observation
remains true irrespective of the height h of the tree, as shown in both the figures for h ∈
{100, 150, 200}. This is due to the fact that as we increase the privacy budget, we are
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decreasing the noise that is being added and hence the data utility is increased. Also, we
observe that in the chr2 dataset (the smaller dataset), the average relative error is almost
constant for each B and h, regardless of the query length. On the other hand, in the chr10
dataset, given B and h, the average relative error is variable depending on the query length.
This is due to the fact that in the larger dataset the size of the data grows, and more noise is
added to ensure privacy since the noisy count of more partitions will surpass the threshold θ.
Therefore, we conclude that as the data grows, the utility increases but it becomes sensitive
to the query length.
We also compare the performance of our proposed algorithm with the research work
done by Wang et al. [88] for the differentially-private genome data dissemination through
top-down specialization. We use the same dataset as in [88], and make the experimental
settings as close as possible. We set the privacy budget B = 1, and determine the accuracy
of our algorithm as follows:

Accuracy = 1 − Average Relative Error

(6.2)

where the relative error is computed using Equation 6.1.
Figure 6.6 illustrates that for both the datasets chr2 and ch10, our proposed algorithm
provides higher accuracy than [88]. That is, for B = 1, both the algorithms achieve better
accuracy on the larger dataset (chr10), however our solution achieves a higher accuracy of
up to 70%.
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Figure 6.4: Average relative error with respect to the query length percentage for the chr2
dataset
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Figure 6.5: Average relative error with respect to the query length percentage for the chr10
dataset
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Chapter 7

CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK

7.1

Summary

In this thesis, we did extensive research on differentially-private data publishing and propose an approach for privacy-preserving genomic data publishing via differentially-private
suffix tree that maintains effective level of data utility for data mining and is scalable and
efficient. We observe that it is feasible to design an algorithm for differentially-private
genomic data publishing that generates high utility. In the experimental evaluation of our
approach, the best data utility is obtained for B = 1.25 for both the datasets irrespective of
h. As the data grows, the utility is higher but it becomes more sensitive to the query length.
In Chapter 2, we introduce and discuss the terms and definitions that are significant
to our thesis work. We explain genomic data, differential privacy and the mechanisms to
achieve differential privacy i.e., Laplace, Exponential and Gaussian. We also discuss the
relaxations of differential privacy, local differential privacy and the composition properties
of differential privacy.
In Chapter 3, we elaborate the related work that has been done in the field of our
thesis research. We discuss privacy-preserving data publishing and privacy-preserving
data mining with respect to genomic and non-genomic data. We also did a comparative
evaluation of the PPDP and PPDM techniques related to genomic data.
In Chapter 4, we propose our solution for privately publishing genomic data. We pro-
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pose a three-phase approach that includes differentially-private partitioning tree generation,
bottom-up normalization and differentially-private suffix tree generation. The proposed
solution is scalable, efficient and preserves high utility for the data mining tasks.
In Chapter 5, we perform the privacy and complexity analysis of our approach. We
show that our approach preserves privacy and is scalable even with respect to the large
datasets.
In Chapter 6, we evaluate the performance of our algorithm. We performed the experiments to determine the scalability, efficiency and utility of our solution. The experiments
demonstrate that our approach is scalable, efficient and maintains high utility with respect
to count queries.
In a nutshell, the main contribution of this thesis is to propose an approach for privacypreserving genomic data publishing via differentially-private suffix tree, which satisfies
B-differential privacy, preserves data utility and is efficient and scalable.

7.2

Looking Ahead

As for future work, it would be interesting to explore how to determine the optimal value
of tree height h in a differentially-private manner instead of having it as a user input, given
that it determines the depth of the partitioning tree P and the length of the suffixes that will
eventually be inserted in the suffix tree. We also look forward to exploring how to support
different types of count queries for searching on the genomic data, as well as other types of
queries, such as fuzzy search matching queries and frequent sequential pattern queries.
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